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I. Introduction
In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the provision of public goods in Russia. My evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in the oblast administrations of Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. The core principles of Eastern Orthodox monastic organization are solidarity, obedience and universal discipline. I model them into strategic games and then transform them into treatments in a series of public goods experiment.
Moreover, I establish the Soviet system of bureaucratic incentives as the institutional bridge between post-Soviet Russian bureaucracies and Eastern Orthodox monasteries.
In post-Soviet Russia there have been two critical and contradictory dimensions in the study of the bureaucracy. On the one hand, bureaucrats have been treated as one of the main factors for the country's economic stagnation and institutional backwardness. Extensive 2 corruption, lack of technical skills, hoarding of state resources both under socialism and postsocialism have been only a few of the negative aspects of the Soviet and Russian civil service. On the other hand, regional bureaucracies have been essential for tracing the pathways of policy implementation. Despite their financial constraints and deficiencies in vocational training, they perform a series of duties and services that link the federal government with businesses -domestic and multinational -aid organizations, and the lower half of the population's income distribution. This is why regional bureaucracies form the ideal venue for the study of economic collectivism in the Russian Federation. Regional bureaucrats are components of the hierarchical monitoring structure, originating in the Kremlin and ending in municipalities and city districts. A public goods experiment that measures their degree of adherence to principles of Eastern Orthodox administrative organization can provide solid evidence on whether Eastern Orthodoxy has been an inherent part of Russian state culture and challenge the conventional wisdom of Soviet atheism.
Following the line of Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke, I do not treat religion and political economy as antithetical (1996) ; on the contrary, I am convinced that religion can explain political and social phenomena away from the conventional labels of fundamentalism and irrationality.
Different religions generate different types of distributive hierarchies. Second, I enrich the existing literature on religion and political economy by offering a political theory that refutes the basic premises of secularism and its proposed dichotomies between sacred and profane institutions.
In this paper, my theoretical and experimental results on the effects of solidarity, obedience and universal discipline on the provision of public goods are not identical. The derived equilibrium solutions suggest that under solidarity the public good is not delivered, whereas under obedience and universal discipline is delivered. In all three cases, they are Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. In the OLS estimations of the experimental data, universal discipline induces higher contributions toward the public good at group and rank levels. This implies that -contrary to theoretical findings -obedience as an Eastern Orthodox principle does not have policy implications for the delivery of public goods by Russian bureaucracies. Furthermore, universal discipline leads to higher levels of private rewards both at group and rank levels. This set of observations leads to the definition of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy that advances individual welfare only when the collective minimum is reached. The threat of collective punishment and the ensuing learning process as a result of its imposition induce self-investment in the provision of public goods.
I also find that the principal contributes more toward the public good than bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3. This suggests that the efficient preservation of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy requires a higher sacrifice from the leadership rather than lower administrative ranks. Thus, postSoviet authoritarianism, which is so often observed in countries with an Eastern Orthodox majority, is likely to endure, only if the political, administrative and economic elites are inclined to provide public goods above the citizenry's overfulfillment threshold and relatively more than the lower ranks of the bureaucracy. In Eastern Orthodox hierarchies, the normative prerequisite for an efficient contribution increases discontinuously with rank.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide an overview of the literature and in section 3 I discuss the relationship between Eastern Orthodoxy and the provision of public goods in Russia. In section 4, I setup and solve a public goods game in its static and dynamic forms as they correspond to solidarity, obedience and universal discipline. The results of the model are tested empirically in section 5 which presents the experimental design. Results are reported and discussed in section 6. In section 7, I provide the conclusions.
II. Literature
Modern social science has defined religion in the form of institutional entities that complement or substitute state functions in the provision of social welfare. It has also treated religiosity as verbal adherence to the existence of God or membership to a religious community.
Huber and Stanig argue that state provision of social services through local churches puts the religious and secular poor in competition against each other in democracies, because it favors the former at the expense of the latter (2011) . Scheve and Stasavage propose that social insurance and religiosity are substitute mechanisms with respect to life's adverse events and therefore shape people's demands for welfare state provisions in opposite directions; more religious people are inclined to be less dependent on social insurance (2006) . Based on World Values Survey data from 1995-97 Torgler argues that different proxies of religiosity induce higher tax morale and that this finding justifies the use of non-economic factors in the study of economic behavior (2006) . Gill and Lundsgaarde treat the welfare state as a substitute to social services provided by the local churches (2004: 399) . They suggest that a strong welfare state is conducive to higher levels of secularization and thus modernization (2004) .
The historical variables of control, respect and obedience, which are invoked by Tabellini in his effort to explain regional variation in economic performance across Europe, offer an interesting, yet limited set of analytical conclusions (2010) . Tabellini stresses the significance of culture for economic behavior and suggests that personal independence and social capital are crucial factors for economic development (2010) . At the same time, the cultural division of labor constitutes a necessary, but not sufficient condition for class struggle; as long as a nondemocratic government is able to maintain the welfare of stratified workers at an acceptable minimum, the probability of revolution or loss of legitimacy of the incumbent government is definitely low (Hechter, 1978: 315-316) .
Public goods experiments usually take place in the form of classroom games; people sit in the same room, but do not have direct eye contact with each other. They also record their contributions per round on special earnings or payoff sheets (Holt and Laury, 1997). As Marwell and Ames indicate, while the weak free-rider hypothesis holds, the overall private contributions by experiment participants undermine the formal validity of that theory (1981) . People may still contribute toward a public good, even if they consider the possibility that another group member will contribute less while hoping to free-ride on the rest of the society (Marwell and Ames, 1981) .
Ironically, only economists, when participating in the Marwell and Ames experiments, seem to validate by approximation the free-rider hypothesis (1981) .
Fehr and Gächter propose that cooperators prefer to impose punishments on free-riders, even when they are costly for them; they suggest that the presence of a punishment condition induces full cooperation among subjects that otherwise defect when there is a no-punishment condition (2000) . Their theory of costly punishment finds particular application under Strangertreatment -when random group composition in each period occurs -rather than under Partnertreatment -when group composition remains the same across periods (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) .
The confirmation of the weak free-rider hypothesis can also be explained by conditional 5 cooperation; with the use of a contribution table, 50 percent of the subjects stated their intention to contribute more toward the public good if their co-players contribute more (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001 ). This observation -backed up by additional evidence from public goods gamesadds a third category to cooperators and free-riders; reciprocators (Burlando, 2005) . This is why a theory of heterogeneous agents and endogenous group formation can be particularly useful when there is no hierarchical relationship between experimental subjects (Burlando, 2005) .
As Palfrey and Prisbrey point out, experienced players are more stable and less altruistic in their contributions across periods, the more experience they accumulate (1997) . They also show that not only the threshold level of the public good but also the marginal value of the private good influence each player's contribution decision per round and per experimental session (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997) . In his seminal article on public goods experiments, Andreoni proposes that strategic behavior or learning alone cannot account for decay in public goods experiments (1988) .
Partners contribute more to the public good than Strangers, and this may be due to the fact that Partners adjust their priors faster than Strangers to the collected sum in round n-1 of an n round experiment (Andreoni, 1988) .
This learning process becomes more effective when there is a concrete threshold to be achieved. The reason is that there is a binary dilemma imposed on experiment participants; to over-or under-contribute toward collective welfare. This is in line with Andreoni, who argues about the significance of social norms with respect to levels of cooperation (1988) . Social norms may sustain a high level of cooperation in repetitive public goods games with a finite horizon, and thus induce learning ex-ante rather than ex-post. In my experiments, I make use of Partnertreatment only and allow for hierarchical differentiation across group members. Eastern Orthodoxy is the singular common ground that can explain the existence of rigid yet collectivist hierarchies in the Russian bureaucracy.
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III. Eastern Orthodoxy and the Provision of Public Goods in Russia
Hierarchy, solidarity and universal discipline are central in Eastern Orthodox theology and organization. If the core of the Orthodox tradition -according to St. John the Chrysostom -is the idea that the state should imitate the norms and organization of the church in order to achieve its optimal form, then it is seems appropriate to test this idea with Russian bureaucrats at the subnational level. In his work on Russian intellectual history and the relationship between the individual and the collective, Kharkhordin draws the fascinating analogy between Soviet collectives and Orthodox congregations (2005: 51-56 (Goldfrank, 1975) . In his approach of coenobitic life, he argues in the Extended Rule that mercy and charity are critical for the self-preservation of the monastery and its ability to fulfill its social welfare obligations, i.e. meeting the needs of the poor (Goldfrank, 1975) . Moreover, he suggests that the monastery is a worldly institution and thus it is also defined by material needs and principles that may define also other forms of communal organization; contrary to Goldfrank 7 (1975) , who understands the monastery as a reflection of Muscovy's political and economic structures, I argue that the monastery itself perpetuates political and economic structures that have been far more ancient than Muscovy.
The key distinction between Joseph Volotsky and Nil Sorsky, the Athonite monk who was Volotsky's contemporary and equally influential in the Russian Orthodox Church, is the following:
while Sorsky prioritized hermitage and Hesychast asceticism, Volotsky treated monasticism as a worldly elite institution. Penitence, material detachment and emotional indifference are some of the prerequisites of the Hesychast ideal of stillness, which lies in the core of Sorsky's Byzantine Orthodox thought in early modern Russia (Goldfrank, 1975) .
This very idea of abstinence from property is central in the theological thought of St. John the Chrysostom, where the koinonia of resources is essential for the unity and utility of the church (Petrou, 1996) . Nevertheless, koinonia is not only material; it also has a direct personal dimension, because property is only complementary to personal communication and human salvation through the community of persons. Hence, mysticism is not in opposition to asceticism; the Hesychast tradition suggests that the former should rather be seen as an extension of the latter (Buss, 1989) . The end is Kaini Ktisi, the creation of a new world on the basis of Eastern Orthodox principles; the Church as an institution is a necessary prerequisite in that respect (Nissiotis, 1961) .
Thus, the Church in the Orthodox tradition becomes the paradigmatic structure for the state. The monastic community lies in the core of this administrative system. The mainstream position of the Hesychast tradition in Orthodox Christianity, within the boundaries of Byzantine Empire and beyond, and the willingness of the Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos to support the Hesychast cause confirm its key role in the development of the Orthodox commonwealth (Meyendorff, 1988) .
Marcuse, in his explanation of the new rationality emerged in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, proposes that transition from capitalism to communism was conditioned by social processes, reinforcement of the state apparatus, elimination of competitive ideologies, achievement of a subsistence minimum, industrialization and agricultural collectivization (Marcuse, 1961: 63-64) . The formation of vertical and centralized administrative structures that proclaim to eradicate individual interests vis-à-vis collective welfare in many instances was more rhetorical than real. 8 Nevertheless, the Soviet synthesis of common interest is elaborated in Marcuse as a negation of individual freedom and inequality (Marcuse, 1961: 100-103) . This is why I treat orthodoxy and central planning as a continuum in terms of bureaucratic organization. They constitute the two leading cultural paradigms in Russian history since the 10 th century, when the principality of Kievan Rus' adopted Orthodox Christianity from Constantinople in 988 AD; they have both defined Russian identity in stark contrast with the West, whose main cultural elements have been capitalism and any of the two leading versions of Western Christianity, Catholicism or Protestantism (Makrides and Uffelmann, 2003) . The imperial heritage of Byzantium constitutes a key component of Russia's national self-consciousness (Papanikolaou, 2003) . Since the Byzantine emperor was seen as the representative of God and the Empire itself the depiction of the Divine Kingdom on Earth, Russia's lack of democratic culture may be linked to its Eastern Orthodox tradition (Papanikolaou, 2003) . Rational individualism is the cornerstone of Western Christianity and capitalism, as well as of capitalism's political outgrowth: democracy.
Rather than making an argument about the incompatibility of orthodoxy with democratic values and economic development, I define Eastern Orthodox collectivism as a form of political and economic organization, alternative to market economy and democracy, with distinctive microfoundations and bureaucratic characteristics.
This abstinence of the Russian administrative state from the Weberian ideal type is linked to a strong commitment to communitarianism and the creation of relational rather than professional policy networks (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004) . The size of the Russian civil service is considered to be inefficient and its education substandard by Western criteria; nevertheless, it fulfills multidimensional social functions (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004) . Although it is not accurate to define Russia as collectivist and the West as individualist in an exclusive way, it is certainly the case that the Russian administrative state has determined the concept of economic and political community in a radically different way than its Western counterparts (Stoeckl, 2007: 6-12 ). The government is not just the collective representation of citizens' individual interests. It serves broader social functions that transcend the boundaries between what we perceive as public and private; education, healthcare, energy regulation and transportation are critical policy areas, where the state does not function as a profit-maximizing entrepreneur or a mere coordinator of public 9 activities. On the contrary, it has the absolute authority in defining public interest, since it controls all governance structures in the Russian society, both vertical and horizontal.
The ability of the Russian executive to enforce collaborative rather than competitive structures in the provision of public goods is due to a mix of repressive technology and transactional efficiency. Thus, the Russian administration becomes the embodiment of family and community values at the macro-level. Selective resonance to contract enforcement and judicial institutions does not mean that resource allocation occurs without the existence of functioning institutions (Hendley, Ryterman and Murrell, 1999) . 2 The Russian administrative state is a complex organization of overlapping hierarchies, subject to scrutiny and control by immediate supervisors; this is why any trace of administrative justice in Russia is certainly not a victory of citizens against local or federal arbitrariness (Solomon, 2004: 574-575 ).
The political economy of democratic reform in the 1990s has been severely criticized for its intent to destroy the collectivist core in Russia's political and economic system and substitute it with a privatized version of the state, which would have no distributive obligations toward the citizens (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005) . This is why the democratic experiment failed in Russia:
because instead of becoming the principled polity of the middle class, democracy was treated as equivalent to an arbitrary form of government, run by privatized state elites. The icon of the state, perpetuating the Byzantine political tradition of the Emperor, constitutes a solid ideological stronghold, which is defined by the divide-and-rule principle vis-à-vis the citizens, and constrains any major form of civic organization. Civicness and trust as alternative foundations of governance are seen as threats to community cohesion, because they limit the role of the state as supplier of public goods and social services. This multiplicity of organizational forms facilitates high levels of administrative corruption, mainly targeted at small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which play by default a minor role in generating public goods for the government and hence contributing to regime legitimacy (Safavian, 2001) . Unity rather than diversity, and the perception of a super state that embodies collective interests and has messianic traits are in the core of both Marxian and Byzantine political traditions (Rothbard, 1990) . Unlike Protestant bureaucracies, where ex-ante enforcement mechanisms form the basis of state-society relations and social trust, in post-communist Russia the minimization of exogenous risk, and thus the maintenance of a rational hierarchy forms the basis of administrative decision-making and public goods distribution (Rubin, 1994) . Treating communism as Russia's civil religion and orthodoxy as the primary form of theological expression in Russian history may provide the cultural foundations of bureaucracy and regime formation in post-Soviet Russia, both under Yeltsin and Putin (Dinello, 2003) .
IV. The Model
How can these arguments be formally developed? Modeling the Russian bureaucracy as a hierarchical organization that operates on the basis of obedience, solidarity and universal discipline provides a baseline for the experimental results that I am presenting in subsequent section of this paper.
Standard Form with Rank Differentiation
I assume an administrative agency with three different administrative ranks:
, which means that the principal of the administrative agency is singular, and the lower the administrative rank the higher the number of the agents. I assume a linear utility for all three ranks, which has the following structure:
χ is the initial endowment of any bureaucrat i where i=1, 2, or 3, i θ is his monetary contribution toward the public good, i Ζ his private rewards from the delivery of the public good, which is monotonically decreasing in i θ , i β is a parameter between 0 and 1, which denotes the degree of hierarchical accountability for the provision of public goods, such that 1
≤ is the probability of threshold fulfillment if bureaucrat i overfulfills and bureaucrats -i underfulfill, and
≤ is the probability of 3 See also Arnott Richard and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out of Peer Monitoring?" American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, March 1991: 179-190. threshold fulfillment if bureaucrat i underfulfills and bureaucrats -i overfulfill. Based on the proposed income differentiation across bureaucratic ranks, the following inequalities hold:
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By the implicit function theorem I define
. Therefore, the second-order conditions for the principal have the following form:
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Following the standard public goods game, the players' actions are strategic substitutes such that , 0
The same assumption holds also for the extension I present here. This means that the higher the contributions of bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3, the lesser the contribution of the principal. The same holds symmetrically for bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3. There is no reason for him to contribute more, if he can achieve the same public good payoff by contributing the least to it. The standard public goods game with linear payoffs identifies two types of Nash equilibria (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) . The first one is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where everybody bids zero such that . 0
The second one is also a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where everybody bids the same monetary contribution such that
where N is the total number of players.
In my propositions below, I provide the Nash equilibria derived from my extension to the standard form with differentiated ranks. 
Proposition 1:
bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 set their contributions such that
im inf { : } 0 and lim inf { : } 0.
This is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
and a weakly dominant strategy as it implies the existence of a continuum of Nash equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 1
As indicated in the second-order conditions matrices of the principal, if
> < > , then the principal has an incentive to overfulfill at the minimum level 1 θ .
More specifically, if his individual cost of non-delivery is higher than the individual welfare from delivery and if the probability of non-delivery for the public good is lower when he overfulfills than when he underfulfills, then the principal has an incentive to set the threshold equal to the minimum level m, assuming that the contributions of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 tend to zero.
Proof of Corollary 1a
As indicated in the second-order conditions matrices of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3, if
bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 have an incentive to underfulfill, assuming that the principal is better off by over-rather than underfulfilling when they freeride. The principal has an incentive to set t m = , so that his own contribution has a limit in 1 θ , as the contributions of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 approximate zero if and only if 1
In a public goods game with hierarchical differentiation, the principal contributes the infimum of his overfulfillment space, whereas bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 contribute the infimum of their respective underfulfillment spaces. Both the principal and lower-level bureaucrats have an interest in the delivery of the public good; the comparative income advantage of the principal makes his own contribution critical for this outcome. Therefore, without his overfulfillment the public good is not going to be delivered, as the principal anticipates that bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 have an incentive to freeride. At the same time, bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 decide to freeride, as they expect that the principal is better off by offering a contribution. The equilibrium set has the following form:
Thus, the public good is not delivered in the standard form as 1 . m θ < Solidarity I now assume that the bureaucrats decide about whether to deliver a social good. This is not for the general public, including themselves, but it addresses the needs of poorer and more disadvantaged members of the society. The differences from the standard form model are the following:
1. The private rewards payoff from solidarity is lower than the private rewards payoff from the delivery of the public good, such that 
The players' actions in this game are also strategic substitutes such that Solidarity is more likely to be observed in societies with less rather than more inequality.
Proof of Proposition 2
The principal is even less incentivized to contribute toward the social good, and thus he underfulfills. This is why his contribution is now located in the upper bound of his underfulfillment space. Solidarity does not make bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 improve their contribution: they are expected to freeride here as well, as per proposition 1.
Thus, the equilibrium has the following form: Under Bayesian monitoring, the principal has learned the performance of bureaucrats of rank 2, and bureaucrats of rank 2 have learned the performance of bureaucrats of rank 3. The contributions of bureaucrats of rank 2 form a signal for the principal that can influence his own contribution in round n+1. The same holds for bureaucrats of rank 2 with respect to the contributions of bureaucrats of rank 3. The less a supervisee contributes in period 1, the more likely it is that he will be punished with non-delivery also in period 2. The immediate supervisor makes him pay the cost of non-delivery by deciding to freeride. The continuation payoffs in that case can be written in the following form: On the contrary, the introduction of obedience in the form of strategic adjustment to the perceived expectations of immediate supervisors allows bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 to show the degree of their distributive commitment in period 1. This monitoring structure has two unique elements: 1. It has a learning effect on the contributions of immediate supervisors in period n+1, and 2. It creates a hierarchical accountability dilemma for hierarchically-inferior bureaucrats in period 1. Bureaucrats of rank 2 both learn the performance of rank 3 bureaucrats and are hierarchically accountable to the principal for their own performance in period n. Hence, obedience corresponds to a non-individualist worldview on public goods provision.
Hierarchically lower bureaucrats become aware that there is a smaller probability that the public good will be provided in round n+1 if they freeride in period n, and immediate supervisors are enforced to think beyond their private endowment and preserve their hierarchical authority. This is the Orthodox worldview in bureaucratic organization and the public sector. Rather than performing cross-rank equalization to the bottom, the Orthodoxminded bureaucrat takes into account his own hierarchical position, which defines the degree of his distributive commitment, while accounting for the contributions of others. Under conditions of obedience or hierarchical accountability, everybody is given the opportunity to strategically adjust its strategy so that there is a better opportunity for the provision of the public good.
Individual repentance rather than individual punishment lies in the core of Eastern Orthodox theology and is reflected in what I define as Bayesian monitoring.
If hierarchy preservation lies in the core of an efficient Orthodox bureaucrat, then the system of linear payoffs for all ranks has the following form: 2 2 2 2 2 2 12 n 11 1 n 11 1 n 2 2 11 1 n 2 2 11 1 n 2 2 11 1 n 2 2ˆ(
Similarly, for bureaucrats of rank 2: 
which is the hierarchical budget constraint imposed on bureaucrats of rank 2 who are both monitored by the principal and monitor bureaucrats of rank 3, and 2 µ is a parameter.
Similarly, for bureaucrats of rank 3, who are just monitored by bureaucrats of rank 2: 
Proof of Proposition 3
To show that obedience is more likely to lead to public goods provision than ex-ante efficiency, I
show that Bayesian monitoring weakly dominates ex-ante (synchronic) monitoring. 
is a payoff function, discontinuous at t , and it is possible for bureaucrats of rank 2 either to contribute below or above 2 θ . However, they are incentivized to contribute at least 2 θ under obedience (right-hand side payoff), because the principal can find out whether they freeride and reduce his own contribution toward the public good to such an extent that the public good is not delivered. In that case, freeriding does not make them better off. For a bureaucrat of rank 2, the principal's threat for free-riding in case he contributes below 2 θ is relatively more credible than an underfufillment signal of any bureaucrat of rank 3. Thus, given their dual function in this type of game, bureaucrats of rank 2 have higher incentives to contribute rather than freeride at the expense of the collective, even when their supervisees of rank 3 do so. Bureaucrats of rank 3 contribute less consistently above 3 θ , because they do not have any immediate supervisees and thus they do not know how much the other members of the collective contribute. The principal enforces rather than tolerates obedience. Nevertheless, he is also more likely to increase his contribution under obedience such that 0 > π because his contribution is not to be manipulated by his supervisees. Obedience sacrifices the middle-level + + − ≥
Proof of Corollary 3a
It follows from the proof of proposition 3. 
If Protestantism and Eastern
Universal Discipline
I now assume that the principal can punish bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 in period 2, if the public good is not delivered in period 1. The model is set up as follows:
1. In period 1, I assume that the public good is not delivered such that 13 n n 11 1 n n 11 1 n n 2 2 11 1 n n 11 1 n n (S ,S ) (1 ) 
Proof of proposition 4
Because the principal can enforce rank-differentiated penalties on his supervisees, he has the incentive to transfer the total cost of public good delivery onto them and free-ride at their expense.
Proof of corollary 4a
Because in period 2 (universal discipline) the principal almost confiscates the initial endowment of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 such that 
− χ θ
. In this case, the principal also bids zero, because the threshold he set is reached anyway.
Proof of proposition 5
I prove the proposition for bureaucrats of rank 2. It is necessary to prove that: 2  2  21  2  21  2  21  2  21  2   21  2 n  21  2 n  3  3  21  2 n  3  3   21  2 n  3  3  21  2 n  3  3  2  2  2 (1 ) ( |t 
θ is in the neighborhood of 2 χ and therefore the public good is definitely delivered, whereas the only case where the same certainty holds under obedience is when , and therefore bureaucrats of rank 2 will always contribute more in period 3 of universal discipline rather than in period 2 of obedience. Hence, the public good is more likely to be delivered that way as well.
The same holds for the principal and bureaucrats of rank 3. The marginal utility from private rewards of the public good delivery will always be higher for any bureaucrat under universal discipline rather than under obedience.
Proof of corollary 5a
It follows from the proof of proposition 5.
Thus, the equilibrium has the following form: 1  1  1  2  2  2  3  3  3  2  3ˆˆ,  ,  , 
V. Experimental Design
The public goods experiment, which I ran, involved bureaucrats in the multifunctional centers for the provision of state and municipal services as well as the regional administration headquarters in the cities of Tomsk and Novosibirsk. Bureaucrats have the professional duty to deliver public goods. I tested the extent to which the principles that defined both Soviet collectives and Orthodox monasteries hold when it comes to the contemporary Russian bureaucracy.
I selected 8 bureaucrats based on their availability during their lunch break. I made sure that they understand the rules of the experiment and were willing to participate into it. They sat in the same room, but they had no eye contact with each other. I assigned them randomly to three groups of different administrative rank. Each rank corresponded to a different income level: 15,000 RUB for the principal, 10,000 RUB for bureaucrats of rank 2 and 7,000 RUB for bureaucrats of rank 3. These monetary rewards were nominal due to financial constraints and current political restrictions.
Rank 1 had 1 member, rank 2 had 3 members and rank 3 had 4 members. The threshold of the public good was set by the principal (rank 1) given the constraint that 15,000 RUB < Threshold Public Good < 73,000 RUB (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) . When the public good was not reached, all of them lost L = 5,000 RUB. If the public good was reached, they gained M = 2,500 RUB so that M < L. I repeated the experiment on ten different days with multiple combinations of bureaucrats and administrative ranks. It was possible that a bureaucrat participated in more than one experiment, but never in the principal position more than once and never in rank 2 or 3 more than twice. This hypothesis is a second-order condition of the first one. Now, instead of looking at the fulfillment of the threshold value, I look at the cross-round and cross-treatment contributions of the principal. Universal discipline allows him to freeride much more than under obedience, solidarity or the standard form, because in that case he has the information monopoly and this does not reduce the probability of public goods delivery.
It is important to note that the mirror hypothesis here is that bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 will freeride progressively less across these four treatments. My expected outcome is the inverse of the previous hypothesis: universal discipline rather than hierarchy or solidarity motivates agents to abide by the rules of the administrative collective.
Hypothesis 3: Average group profit is likely to be higher under treatment 4 rather than under any other treatment.
Corollary 3a: Average rank profit is likely to be higher under treatment 1 rather than under any other treatment.
The logic here is straightforward. The higher the degree of Eastern Orthodox collectivist enforcement the higher the average group profit due to the delivery of the public good. The opposite holds for the rank level: the higher the degree of Eastern Orthodox collectivist enforcement the lower the average rank profit because the delivery of the public good occurs at the expense of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3. Tables 1-4: TM11-TM14, TM21-TM24, TM31-TM34, TM41-TM44, TM51-TM54, TM61-TM64, NK71-NK74, NK-81-NK84, NK91- NK94, NK101-NK104, TM31A and TM34A. Tables 2-4 cluster for rank: they summarize average rank contribution for ranks 1, 2 and 3. Per Cadsby and Maynes, I count both the times that the threshold public good is achieved in the last three periods and the times it is achieved overall (1999).
VI. Results
I ran
Tables 1-4 (see below Appendix B) summarize the experimental data per group (Table 1) and rank (Tables 2-4). In times that the public good is provided under treatment 4, the times where the principal-planner enforces provisions are not counted. The logic is to see how many times group cooperation occurs as a learning result of universal discipline rather than to add times of public good delivery that did not occur as an outcome of voluntary cooperation. The same assumption holds for the other three treatments, but without excluding instances of threshold achievement. This is why average group and rank contributions as well as times of public good delivery are measured both in their overall means and in periodic intervals. Table 1 provides a very interesting overview of the cross-treatment levels of average group contribution. Under treatment 2 (solidarity), average group contribution is lower than under treatment 1 (standard game). Moreover, under treatment 3, experiment participants contribute more than under treatment 1 or 2, while treatment 4 induces the highest levels of average group contribution so that shows in tables 2 and 3 is that bureaucrats of rank 3 may be the least likely to make a significant 28 contribution in order to deliver the public good in terms of initial endowment percentage (their initial endowment is 7,000 RUB). Similarly, there is a considerable contribution gap between the principal and bureaucrats of rank 2, whose initial endowment is 10,000 RUB. These preliminary observations are tested in conjunction with the aforementioned H1-3. Tables 5 and 6 provide OLS estimations where standardized average group and rank contributions -both at aggregate and last three-period levels -as well as standardized average group and rank profits are regressed on treatment and -where applicable -rank dummies (fixed effects).
In figure 1 What we learn from the group level results is that:
1. Treatment 4 has a positive effect both on average group contribution at the aggregate level and on average group profit. Thus, universal discipline does not suggest that collective welfare and individual profit are orthogonal in the decision-making processes 30 of the Siberian bureaucracy. This observation underpins the concept of an Eastern
Orthodox hierarchy, where hierarchical provision of public goods does not occur at the expense of efficiency.
2. Treatment 2 has a negative effect on average group contribution in the last three periods.
The more the participants adjust to the rules of the experiment the less willing they become to contribute toward a social good that is directed only to disadvantaged members of society. Solidarity with the poor is confirmed not to be a degree of Orthodox collectivist enforcement, but it is more likely to be observed in market-rather than planbased religions. It requires an efficient horizontal network of public goods provision rather than an efficient centralizing hierarchy. Note: Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. T-statistics are in parentheses. Treatment 1 is a reference for Treatments 2, 3 and 4. On the contrary, bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 freeride consistently more than the principal.
Rank 2 and 3 dummies are positively significant at the 1 percent level in all three models. When the dependent variable is average rank contribution at aggregate and three-last-period levels, the sign of the coefficients is negative. When the dependent variable is average rank profit, the sign of the coefficients is positive.
What we can infer from the OLS results of table 6 is the following:
1. Treatment 4 makes all bureaucrats better off, as it increases the probability of public good delivery, when the punishment period is over. This finding introduces the idea of an efficient hierarchy that treats collective and individual welfare as complements rather than as substitutes. The fact that treatment 4 works for the experimental group of Siberian bureaucrats may explain why unitary organizations, central planning and vertical planning have had such endurance in Russian administrative organization and economic policy.
2. Bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 are freeriding at the expense of the principal. This is a finding contrary to the conventional wisdom about post-communist bureaucracies. The supervisees are inclined to be relatively more corrupt than the supervisor. This is the case both in terms of contributions and in terms of accumulated profit. Repression is a very singular way to explain corruption and authoritarian success in the Eastern Orthodox -and possibly Muslim -lands of the former Soviet Union. The leader needs to contribute a minimum toward the common pool that has to be higher than the relative contributions of his citizens. What I infer for political regimes holds also for ministries and administrative agencies. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. T-statistics are in parentheses. Treatment 1 is a reference for Treatments 2, 3 and 4. Level 1 is a reference for Levels 2 and 3. The experiments I ran with bureaucrats in the oblast administrations of Tomsk and Novosibirsk suggest the existence of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy that defines distributive efficiency in post-Soviet Russian bureaucracies. The principal contributes the most toward the public good, while bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 contribute progressively less. Universal discipline induces both higher levels of contribution and higher profit at the group and rank levels. There is an interesting conclusion to be drawn here about collectivism and the nature of post-Soviet Russian bureaucracy. Unlike in Protestant societies, freeriding is more likely to occur at lower rather than at higher hierarchical levels. Russian administrative principals are more public-minded than their supervisees, because they continue the line of Soviet bureaucrats and the latters' Orthodox institutional vocation. Universal discipline in the form of treatment 4 is necessary to preserve administrative hierarchies and facilitate public goods provision at a minimum threshold. Eastern Orthodoxy has strong political and economic implications. The ideal-type of the Orthodox administrative state is defined by disciplinary enforcement and selfinvestment of its leadership in the provision of public goods.
Appendix A Experimental Instructions
This is an experiment on group decision-making. You are randomly assigned into one out of three groups: 1, 2 or 3. Each group corresponds to a different administrative rank, with 1 being the highest rank. The session will last for fifteen periods per method. In each session you will have to decide how much of your initial private endowment you will contribute to the threshold public good. The value of the threshold public good is defined by the highest-ranked group -group 1 -given the constraint 15.000 RUB < Threshold Public Good < Total Private Endowment.
Method 1:
You have fifteen information sheets in front of you. On each of these you will write date and time, your assigned group, the value of the threshold public good and the value of your contribution. If you belong to group 3, your initial individual income is 7000 RUB, if you belong to group 2, your initial individual income is 10000 RUB, and if you belong to group 1, your initial individual income is 15000 RUB.
You will be asked to record the number of cards that you contribute to the public good privately on your information sheet within three minutes. Then raise your hand, and I will come to collect your information sheet. When all of you are finished I will sum up your contributions to the public good and will announce if the threshold is met. In case it is met, all of you earn M = 2.500 RUB. In case it is not met, all of you lose L = 5.000 RUB. Then, you may calculate your net payment on your net payment sheet. For example the income of a group 3 member is 7.000 RUB and his contribution 3.000 RUB; if the threshold public good is not reached, then his net payment is 7000 -3000 -5000 = -1000 RUB ~ 0 RUB, which becomes zero for the purposes of our experiment, and if the threshold public good is reached, then 7000-3000+2500= 6500 RUB.
Your initial income in the beginning of each round is unaffected by your net payments in the previous round. In the end of the experiment I will collect your net payment sheets. Examples of a public good can be a bridge, a park or a public hospital. You are definitely going to use it during your lifetime.
Method 2:
This procedure is the same as above. The only difference is that this is a threshold social good, i.e. not for all citizens, but only for concrete social groups, such as children, elderly people, and 36 disabled people. Examples of a social good can be a kindergarten, an elderly care house or a community house for disabled people. You may or may not use it during your lifetime.
Method 3:
This procedure is the same as above. The only difference is that in the end of each round, I will report your contribution to your immediate supervisor only (the contributions of group 3 members to group 2 members and the contributions of group 2 members to the group 1 person).
Method 4:
The procedure is the same. The only difference is that if the threshold value is not reached in the end of any round, groups 2 and 3 will have to make the contribution that group 1 person decides for each of them in the subsequent round so that the threshold public good is reached. 
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